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 INTRODUCTION 
 On a bus in West Philadelphia, a woman feeds her baby an ar-
tificial orange beverage from his bottle.  The drink costs much less 
than baby formula, partly because it is mostly comprised of corn—
the largest beneficiary of U.S. agricultural subsidies.1  Currently the 
least expensive food available is also the most caloric and the least 
nutritious:  a dollar’s worth of cookies or potato chips yields 1200 
calories, while a dollar’s worth of carrots yields only 250 calories.2  
A savvy shopper seeking to satiate her family will naturally seek out 
these more caloric but less nutritious items.3
 
1
From 1995 to 2010 the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided 
$77,123,770,222 in subsidy payments for corn, the largest of all subsidized crops.  Envtl. 
Working Grp., The United States Summary Information, 2011 FARM SUBSIDY DATABASE, 
http://farm.ewg.org/region?fips=00000&regname=UnitedStatesFarmSubsidySummary 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011).  Americans spend 6.8% of their income on food—down from 
29% a century ago, far less than industrialized nations such as France and Japan whose 
citizens spend approximately 14% of their income on food.   U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2011, at 853 tbl.1358 (2010), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/11statab/intlstat.pdf. 
  The sticker price is a 
small fraction of the true cost of highly processed foods, which 
contain excessive amounts of sodium, fat, and calories that contri-
2
Adam Drewnowski & SE Specter, Poverty and Obesity:  The Role of Energy Density  
and Energy Costs, 79 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 6, 9 (2004). 
3
See HEATHER SCHOONOVER & MARK MULLER, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, 
FOOD WITHOUT THOUGHT:  HOW THE U.S. FARM POLICY CONTRIBUTES TO OBESITY 8 
(2006) (“Studies have demonstrated that price plays a major role in people’s food pur-
chasing decisions.  For many people, purchasing cheaper foods may not be a matter of 
choice.  But even for those who can afford different options in their food purchases, 
price often drives choices.”); Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 11 (“There is sub-
stantial evidence that food purchases are influenced by food costs . . . . We hypothesize 
that consuming energy-dense foods, and energy-dense diets, is an important strategy 
used by low-income consumers to stretch the food budget.”). 
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bute to an estimated $147 billion in annual healthcare costs.4  
Moreover, these products are artificially cheap because their pro-
duction is subsidized with tens of billions in taxpayer funds each 
year.5  Federal agricultural subsidies have provided Americans with 
high-calorie, low-nutrient processed foods that are less expensive 
and more readily available than whole grains and produce.6  Until 
very recently, poverty was associated with emaciated faces and rail-
thin limbs, but today malnutrition persists despite an abundance of 
cheap calories.7  Our nation is in the midst of an obesity epidemic 
that is not only a question of weight, but also implicates serious 
health conditions caused by poor nutrition such as heart disease, 
diabetes, and some types of cancers.8
 
4
Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity:  Payer-  
and Service-Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFF. w822, w828 (2009), http:// 
content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/5/w822.full.pdf+html?sid=8e3da08f-804a-4e9a-
bdb5-ba052755032e; see also B. Sherry et al., Vital Signs:  State-Specific Obesity Prevalence 
Among Adults—United States, 2009, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 951, 952 
(2010) (reporting that obese individuals spend $1429 more on healthcare annually 
than nonobese people). 
  The next generation of 
5
See Envtl. Working Grp., USDA Subsidies for Farms in United States Totaled 
$246,718,000,000 from 1995 Through 2009, 2011 FARM SUBSIDY DATABASE, http:// 
farm.ewg.org/regiondetail.php?fips=00000&summlevel=2&statename=theUnitedStates 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (showing that the United States paid annual subsidies rang-
ing from over $15 billion to nearly $25 billion between 2000 and 2010). 
6
See SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 3, at 6-7 (indicating that the cost of fruits 
and vegetables has risen forty percent since 1985, while soda, fats, and oils have de-
creased in price due to “[t]he low cost of commodities like corn and soybeans [which] 
make sugars and fats some of the cheapest food substances to produce”); Drewnowski 
& Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (“Americans are gaining more and more weight while 
consuming more added sugars and fats and are spending a lower proportion of their 
income on food”). 
7
In 2010 14.5% of American households, or 48.8 million people, were food inse-
cure at some point, meaning those households were uncertain of being able to obtain 
enough food to meet the needs of all members.  Econ. Research Serv., Food Security in the 
United States:  Key Statistics and Graphics, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/ 
foodsecurity/stats_graphs.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).  
8
A Surgeon General’s report characterized obesity as an epidemic:  
Overweight and obesity may not be infectious diseases, but they have reached 
epidemic proportions in the United States . . . . In 1999, an estimated 61 per-
cent of U.S. adults were overweight or obese, and 13 percent of children and 
adolescents were overweight.  Today there are nearly twice as many overweight 
children and almost three times as many overweight adolescents as there were 
in 1980 . . . . Approximately 300,000 deaths a year in this country are currently 
associated with overweight and obesity. 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE SURGEON 
GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY, at 
xiii (2001). 
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Americans may be the first in history to have a shorter lifespan 
than its parents.9
The national obesity epidemic is a multifaceted crisis with many 
factors that go beyond the scope of this Comment.
 
10  Similarly, the 
2008 Farm Bill is omnibus legislation spread across more than a dozen 
titles in the United States Code, spanning everything from food 
stamps and school lunches to environmental conservation and agri-
cultural research.11  This Comment evaluates how programs intended 
to support farm prices and income influence producers and consum-
ers.12  Commodity production13 is at the core of the obesity epidemic 
because highly processed foods and meats are mostly comprised of 
subsidized corn, soy, and cereal grains.14  While domestic production15
 
9
See Samuel H. Preston, Deadweight?—The Influence of Obesity on Longevity, 352 NEW 
ENGL. J. MED. 1135, 1136-37 (2005) (arguing that the obesity problem in the United 
States must be addressed to prevent a reduction in life expectancy). 
 
10
For example, physiological factors such as insulin resistance, psychological fac-
tors such as addictive emotional eating, and environmental factors such as sedentary 
work, entertainment, and fast-food marketing to children all contribute to food-related 
health problems.  Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 13.  Moreover, individual 
taste preference and the cultural importance of certain foods are important factors in 
food choice.  Id. at 13-14. 
11
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 
(codified as amended in scattered titles of the United States Code).  
12
Consumer benefits programs—food stamps, school lunches, and the Special 
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)—are also 
important components of agricultural policy and public health.  See Jess Aldernman et 
al., Application of Law to the Childhood Obesity Epidemic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 90, 92-94 
(2007), for a general discussion of the evolution these programs in response to the ob-
esity epidemic.  Congress recently made significant improvements to the school lunch 
program by imposing nutritional requirements beyond a minimum caloric content.  
Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-296, § 208, 124 Stat. 3183, 
3221–22 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1779).  This and other efforts by  
commercial processors to respond to the health crisis discussed below may be attri-
buted to First Lady Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move!” campaign to address childhood 
obesity.  LET’S MOVE:  AMERICA’S MOVE TO RAISE A HEALTHIER GENERATION OF KIDS, 
http://www.letsmove.gov (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
13
An agricultural commodity is a crop such as corn, wheat, cotton, rice, soy, oats, 
wool, oil, livestock, or frozen concentrated orange juice that is sold on an exchange 
market.  Commodity Exchange Act § 1a, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(4) (2006). 
14
See Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that these are the 
most high-density foods with the lowest consumption costs).  Supporters of agricultural 
subsidies contend that the benefits of subsidies go far beyond the farm to everyone in-
volved in the food production and distribution chain.  See, e.g., Robert Goodman, A Six-
Point Defense of Farm Subsidies, EXTENSION DAILY (Oct. 8, 2004, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.aces.edu/department/extcomm/npa/daily/archives/000749.php (“Far-
mers receive direct benefits, but others along the way benefit indirectly through 
cheaper production inputs, which, in turn, contribute to lower production costs.”).  
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and food price are not the only factors contributing to the problem, 
this Comment questions the value of using the third-largest federal 
benefits program16 to reduce the cost of commodities that contribute 
to $147 billion in annual obesity-related health costs.17  The issue of 
obesity has been well addressed by social scientists and natural scien-
tists, by writers and food advocates.18  Yet legal scholarship on agricul-
ture has focused entirely on environmental or international trade is-
sues without addressing how federal legislation impacts what farmers 
decide to plant and what people choose to eat.19
Part I evaluates past and current legislation that was designed to 
impact food production and prices.  Farm legislation has focused on 
controlling the supply or price of agricultural commodities through 
income supports, acreage reduction programs, marketing agreements 
  This Comment re-
commends legislative action for the 2012 Farm Bill to make fruits, 
vegetables, and whole grains comparatively less expensive than un-
healthy processed foods and meats. 
 
15
While many agricultural products are imported, data indicate that U.S. com-
modity prices significantly influence international market prices, which is why the 
World Trade Organization consistently pressures the United States to end agricultural 
subsidies.  DARYLL E. RAY ET AL., AGRIC. POLICY ANALYSIS CTR., UNIV. OF TENN.,  
RETHINKING US AGRICULTURAL POLICY:  CHANGING COURSE TO SECURE FARMER  
LIVELIHOODS WORLDWIDE 2 (2003), available at http://www.agpolicy.org/blueprint/ 
APACReport8-20-03WITHCOVER.pdf; see also  Review of US Agricultural Policy in Advance 
of the 2012 Farm Bill: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 111st Cong. 4 (2010) (state-
ment of Daryll E. Ray, Professor, Univ. of Tenn.) (arguing that an “increase in domes-
tic [consumption] has been far more important to U.S. farmers than the vacillation of 
grain exports”). 
16
Behind Social Security and Medicare, the Farm Bill is the largest federal bene-
fits program (although approximately half of the budget is spent on food stamps, 
school lunches, and WIC programs).  DAVID RAPP, HOW THE U.S. GOT INTO AGRICUL-
TURE AND WHY IT CAN’T GET OUT 15 (1988). 
17
See Finkelstein et al., supra note 4, at w828 (stating that “obesity continues to 
impose an economic burden on both public and private payers”). 
18
Michael Pollan, Eric Schlosser, and Mark Bittman have done excellent work 
connecting health problems to food production.  See MICHAEL POLLAN, OMNIVORE’S 
DILEMMA:  A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS (2006) (examining the American  
“national eating disorder” by tracing food production from the source to the table); 
ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION (2005) (offering a critical account of the devel-
opment and current state of the American fast food industry); Mark Bittman, A Food 
Manifesto for the Future, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:28 PM), http:// 
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/a-food-manifesto-for-the-future (discuss-
ing ideas for making the “growing, preparation, and consumption of food healthier, 
saner, more productive, less damaging, and more enduring”).  However, a legal pers-
pective is required to move from policy points to legislative action. 
19
See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation:  Rethinking U.S. Agricul-
tural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 602-13 (2010) 
(considering the environmental problems the current agricultural system creates).  
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and processing taxes, nonrecourse loans, and direct payments.  Each 
of these methods is explained and evaluated with respect to how it 
creates incentives to plant particular crops.  Part II proposes future 
legislation to realign production incentives with modern consumption 
needs.  Part III addresses the potential legal hurdles to implementing 
the suggested legislation: whether eliminating benefits programs 
might give rise to due process concerns; whether regulating agricul-
tural land use might degrade property values to create a regulatory 
takings issue; whether Congress has authority to impose the recom-
mended regulations in light of the Commerce Clause limitations arti-
culated in United States v. Lopez;20 and whether the tax and spend pow-
ers of Congress may again be relied upon after Wickard v. Filburn.21
Price supports and acreage allotments have increased surpluses 
and decreased prices; these measures should not continue.  In order to 
reduce consumption of unhealthy foods and support farm income, 
farm payments must be entirely decoupled from production, programs 
must encourage product diversification,
 
22
I.  AGRICULTURAL LEGISLATION AND FOOD PRICES 
 and highly processed foods 
must be priced to reflect the true costs they impose on the public.  
Agricultural reform can address the food challenges of the twenty-first 
century:  rather than increase the quantity of available food, agricul-
tural legislation must increase the quality of affordable food.  By de-
coupling income supports, ending acreage reduction and limitation, 
and using taxes to impose the true cost of food on processors and con-
sumers, the 2012 Farm Bill can help remedy the obesity epidemic. 
Farm programs were initiated to stabilize crashing farm prices and 
support family farmers who would otherwise have been bankrupted in 
the midst of the Great Depression.23
 
20
514 U.S. 549, 601-02 (1995). 
  However, farm programs have 
consistently caused commodity prices to fall, because the support of 
21
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). 
22
This Comment uses the term polyculture to refer to the agricultural production of 
several different kinds of plants or animals. It may include a variety of the same plant—
such as chili peppers, sweet peppers, and ancho peppers—or a variety of species.  
23
R. DOUGLAS HURT, PROBLEMS OF PLENTY:  THE AMERICAN FARMER IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 67-68 (2002).  Government sponsorship of agriculture is older 
than the United States.  Earl Butz, The Politics of Agricultural Subsidies,  PROC. ACAD. 
POL. SCI., May 1952, at 54, 55.  As early as 1620, tobacco production was limited in Vir-
ginia to stabilize falling prices.  Id.  Most dramatically, the 1862 Homestead Act pro-
vided free land to those who farmed and lived on the frontier.  Id. 
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program crops encourages their overproduction.24  The government 
guarantees a minimum price for program crops, creating a compelling 
incentive to grow more of these crops because government subsidies 
negate the risk of market collapse.25  As the supply increases, prices 
fall.26  This problem of excess supply was the problem that the first 
farm bill, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,27 was intended to 
remedy, but the problem of perpetual surplus has persisted through 
the twenty-first century.28
Rather than stabilize minimum farm prices, farm programs have 
resulted in decreased commodity prices.  The average cost of produc-
tion is twenty to forty percent below the prices received for program 
crops, meaning that commodity subsidies directly contribute up to 
one-third of the price reduction.
 
29  For example, in 2000 farmers 
spent an average of $2.72 to produce a bushel of corn with a market 
value of $1.77.30  Farmers continue to produce corn because govern-
ment payments exceed the difference, generating a one percent net 
income for the farmer regardless of the actual market price.31
 
24
This Comment uses the term “program crops” to refer to the commodities sup-
ported through farm programs.  Farm programs do not cover all commodity crops.  
“Program crops” are therefore a subset of all commodity crops. 
  The 
reduction in the price of commodity crops has harmed consumers by 
25
Nearly three-fourths of all U.S. cropland is dedicated to production of commodi-
ty crops.  See INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, THE FARM BILL AND PUBLIC HEALTH:  AN 
OVERVIEW 2 (2007) (drawing a connection between the high program payments that go 
to these crops and the significant portion of cropland dedicated to producing them).    
26
Id. 
27
Ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31. 
28
There are a few notable exceptions to the surplus problem, mostly fueled by gov-
ernment purchase of grain.  During World War II and the Korean War, the federal gov-
ernment used grain surpluses to feed troops serving abroad.  HURT, supra note 23, at 110.  
In 1979, the United States contracted to sell billions of dollars worth of wheat to the So-
viet Union, which caused a significant rise in agricultural exports.  Id. at 139.  Since 1976, 
however, most U.S. sales of agricultural commodities have been purely domestic.  See  
DARYLL E. RAY & HARWOOD D. SCHAFFER, AGRIC. POLICY ANALYSIS CTR., UNIV. OF  TENN., 
HOW FEDERAL FARM POLICY INFLUENCES THE STRUCTURE OF OUR AGRICULTURE  
2-3 (2005), available at http://www.agpolicy.org/pubs/RaystructuresessionSummary.pdf 
(contending that the export theory of agricultural markets has never been realized). 
29
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 15-23.  But see Julian M. Alston et al., Farm Subsidies 
and Obesity in the United States, AGR. & RESOURCE ECON. UPDATE, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 1, 4 
(arguing that the real impact of this price decrease on consumers is minimal and that 
the price decrease from price support programs is substantially offset by acreage re-
duction programs).  
30
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 10. 
31
The average difference between the subsidy price that the farmer receives and 
the cost of production is approximately one percent.  Id. at 10-11. 
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encouraging overproduction of corn, wheat, rice, and soy.32  In re-
sponse to the overabundance of these crops, manufacturers have 
found inventive ways to process these commodities, creating unheal-
thy foods that are highly processed concoctions of many unpronoun-
ceable ingredients created in a lab.33  Farmers who grow fruits and 
vegetables are not subsidized, and are ineligible even for most conser-
vation programs, because they do not grow program crops.34
Contrary to the legislation’s purpose,
 
35 agricultural subsidies do 
not support small family farmers; real farm income has declined since 
the 1970s.36  Further, the majority of subsidy payments goes to large 
farms with annual revenues of more than half a million dollars.37  
Thus, both consumers and small family farmers are harmed by the ar-
tificial deflation of commodity prices.38
 
32
See, e.g., MARK MULLER ET AL., CONSIDERING THE CONTRIBUTION OF U.S. FOOD 
AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY TO THE OBESITY EPIDEMIC:  OVERVIEW AND OPPORTUNITIES 
21-23 (2007) (connecting the subsidization of poor-quality foods to obesity). 
  Farm Bill reform can provide 
33
See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 18-19 (explaining how technology has put compo-
nents of corn in nearly every food product—-even other vegetables—-and many non-
food products as well). 
34
See DEMECY JOHNSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ELIMINATING FRUIT AND VEGE-
TABLE PLANTING RESTRICTIONS:  HOW WOULD MARKETS BE AFFECTED? 19-23 (2006) (ex-
plaining that fruit and vegetable farmers must weigh the costs of forgoing payments). 
35
Senator Byron Dorgan explained the Farm Bill’s goal of providing a safety net: 
If you have a real tough time, price depressions and other things, the big cor-
porate agrifactories, they can make it through there, but the family farms get 
washed away.  So we developed instead a safety net.  That safety net is rooted 
in the legislation before us, which incidentally I think improves the safety net. 
 153 CONG. REC. 13,763 (2007) (statement of Sen. Byron Dorgan). 
36
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 9 (“Despite these record-level [farm] payments, 
net farm income in the U.S. declined 16.5 percent between 1996 and 2001.”).  Net 
farm income in 2009 was again at 2001 levels after fluctuating significantly from 2004 
through 2008 due to large price fluctuations.  Econ. Research Serv., Farm Income and 
Costs:  2009 Farm Sector Income Estimates, USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ 
FarmIncome/2009incomeaccounts.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).  Steady increases 
in production expenses were also observed from 1999 through 2009.  Id. 
37
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FARM FINANCES FOR ALL FARMS:  
ALL SURVEY STATES GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS 1-2 (2011). 
38
Family farmers are of particular concern because they provide the bulk of agri-
cultural production.  See JAMES MACDONALD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GROWING 
FARM SIZE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF FARM PAYMENTS 2 (2006) (“Family-operated 
farms continue to account for most U.S. agricultural production.”).  However, it 
should be noted that many family-owned farms are also some of the largest farms in 
the country.  Id.  This Comment specifically addresses “small” family-owned farms be-
cause they are crucial to preserving robust domestic agriculture.   
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a remedy to the nutrient-scarcity problem that has resulted in an epi-
demic of obesity, diabetes, and heart disease.39
A.  How Farm Bill Legislation Attempts to Implement Agricultural Policies 
 
Agricultural subsidies focus on “base crops” for pragmatic rea-
sons.40  The first national system of agricultural supports was the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act of 1933, enacted in response to the Great 
Depression.41  The federal government paid farmers for each acre of 
base crops they took out of production.42  The initial commodities in-
cluded corn, wheat, rice, cotton, tobacco, milk, and hogs.43  The gov-
ernment targeted these products because they had significant sur-
pluses and the market demand of these commodities affected the 
prices of others.44  For example, the price of corn impacts the price of 
beef and poultry, since corn is the primary feed for industrial-scale 
meat production.  Further, each of the program crops had to be 
processed before they reached the consumer, making the inputs easi-
er to regulate.45  The first farm bill managed the market supply by im-
posing processing taxes, licensing requirements, and marketing quo-
tas on processors and handlers (such as grain elevators).46
 
39
See MULLER ET AL., supra note 
  This 
legislation was among the first New Deal statutes to be declared un-
32, at 21-27 (concluding that farm subsidies con-
tribute to obesity because they subsidize unhealthy foods).  Contra Alston et al., supra 
note 29, at 4 (arguing that farm program payments do not significantly impact obesity, 
because direct payments have only a small impact on commodity prices and the aver-
age consumer does not make purchasing decisions based on such minimal price dif-
ferences).  This Comment disputes Alston’s contention because the impact of farm 
subsidies extends beyond cash payments.  The incentive to overproduce commodity 
crops drives down prices most dramatically.  The Alston study further presumes that 
acreage reduction offsets price declines due to direct subsidies.  Id.  Unfortunately, 
acreage reduction has virtually no impact on production, as farmers continue to in-
crease yield per acre nearly every year.  See infra subsection I.B.2. 
40
Base crops originally included corn, wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, and milk.  Al-
len H. Olson, Federal Farm Programs–Past, Present and Future—-Will We Learn from Our 
Mistakes?, 6 GREAT PLAINES NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 4 (2001).  Now soybeans and grain 
sorghum are supported instead of tobacco and milk.  There are separate milk pro-
grams in the 2008 Farm Bill.  7 U.S.C. §§ 8771–73 (Supp. III 2010). 
41
See Butz, supra note 23, at 55.  
42
HURT, supra note 23, at 69. 
43
Id. 
44
Id. 
45
Id. 
46
Olson, supra note 40, at 3-4. 
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constitutional.47  However, it was not the tax itself that was deemed un-
constitutional in Butler v. United States, but the fact that the proceeds of 
the tax funded payments to farmers who reduced the acreage used to 
produce commodity crops.48  This regulation of production was held to 
be an exclusively local concern, and beyond Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority.49  Six years later the Supreme Court in Wickard v. Fil-
burn overruled Butler and declared that the Commerce Clause reaches 
any commodity that impacts national commerce in the aggregate.50
In response to Butler, agricultural legislation focused on nonre-
course loans,
 
51 and acreage reduction was reframed as soil conserva-
tion.52  These measures remain cornerstones of agricultural supports.53  
Although the base crops shifted slightly over time—soybeans and  
oil seeds replaced tobacco, milk, and hogs—agricultural  
supports continued to focus on attempts to limit the supply of com-
modity crops to drive up prices.54  In order to reform the current  
system of subsidies, it is important to understand the legislative me-
chanisms for influencing agricultural production and to consider 
which statutory measures may be more or less successful in reducing 
the cost of fresh produce and increasing the relative cost of highly 
processed nonnutritious foods.  The central problem of agriculture is 
that, unlike other industries, efficiency gains can ultimately reduce 
profits because increased production results in surpluses that drive 
down market prices.55
 
47
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936) (“Congress has no power to 
enforce its commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act.  It must follow that it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing 
and spending to purchase compliance.”). 
 
48
Id. at 70. 
49
Id. at 64. 
50
317 U.S. 111, 113 (1942).  See Section III.B for a full discussion of congressional 
authority to regulate agricultural production under the Commerce Clause. 
51
See infra subsection I.B.4. 
52
See, e.g., Butz, supra note 23, at 56.  Indeed, the 1936 legislation was titled the 
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act.  Pub. L. No. 74-461, 49 Stat. 163 (1936) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 590 (2006)).  The Soil Act avoided invalidation 
because the Court in Butler held environmental protection to be a legitimate federal 
object.  297 U.S. at 84.  
53
See infra Section I.B.  
54
RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34696, THE 2008 FARM BILL:  MA-
JOR PROVISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE ACTION 11 (2008).  
55
See generally HURT, supra note 23, at 134 (arguing that the agricultural industry, 
unlike other industries, does not generate more income for producers as efficiency 
increases because increased production creates surpluses that in turn drive down pric-
es).  The gains in agricultural efficiency relative to manufacturing industries are stag-
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B.  Principal Methods of Price Control 
There are two calamities that confront farmers.  One is crop fail-
ure due to drought or other natural disasters.56  The federal govern-
ment provides disaster crop insurance to farmers suffering from crop 
failure.57  The other is an overabundance of crops due to increased 
yields or overplanting.58  This drives down prices for the commodity, 
often below the cost of inputs the farmer has spent to raise and harv-
est the crop.59  When surpluses cause commodity prices to fall, federal 
price and income supports supplement the market price farmers rece-
ives, encouraging continued production despite negative returns.60  In 
fact, in recent years government payments have accounted for the ma-
jority or all of net income for some farms.61  This problem has per-
sisted through all price support methods, from acreage reduction and 
nonrecourse loans to target prices and deficiency payments.62  In the 
1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act63
 
gering:  agricultural production efficiency increased 330% from 1952 to 1972, while 
manufacturing efficiency increased by 160% during the same period.  These efficien-
cies are found in new machinery, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and genetically 
engineered crops.  JIM HIGHTOWER, FOOD, FARMERS, CORPORATIONS, EARL BUTZ . . . 
AND YOU, AGRIBUSINESS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT 1 (1973); see also POLLAN, supra note 
 Con-
18, at 95-99 (discussing how food demand is inelastic because it is limited to the capac-
ity of human food consumption and that in response food processors have created new 
“value-added” foods). 
56
MULLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 16.  
57
Federal Crop Insurance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 (2006). 
58
For example, when corn production reached an all-time high in 2009, average 
corn prices fell thirty-six cents from 2008 prices, fifty cents less than 2007 prices.  NAT’L 
AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CROP VALUES 2009 SUMMARY 21 (2010).  
59
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (showing that in 2003 it cost $2.72 to produce 
a bushel of corn, but the price per bushel was $1.77); see also HIGHTOWER, supra note 
55, at 4 (noting that even during the 1970s export boom, commodity prices were up 
6% since 1952, but input costs had increased 122%). 
60
Income supports were intended to maintain domestic agricultural production, 
but since payments are tied to production, they have the same impact on planting 
choices as price supports.  See FARM SERV. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DIRECT AND 
COUNTER-CYCLE PAYMENTS PROGRAM 1-2 (2008) (outlining commodities eligible for 
direct and countercyle payment programs).  
61
MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 2;  see also, e.g., RAPP, supra note 16, at 31 
(explaining that when target prices were paid during the price collapse of the 1980s, 
fifty-seven percent of farm income was derived from government payments in 1988, up 
from seven percent just eight years earlier); RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 2 (“For 
grain farmers, government payments can—depending on the year—-represent all (or 
more than all) of their net farm income.”). 
62
Olson, supra note 40, at 22-23.  
63
Pub. L. No. 104 -127, 110 Stat. 888 (codified as amended in scattered titles of 
the United States Code). 
FOSTER_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2011  12:58 PM 
246 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 235 
gress attempted to transition farmers to the free market by offering 
production contracts that would support income after price supports 
were eliminated.64  However, the 2002 and 2008 Farm Bills returned to 
income supports, price supports, and acreage reduction programs.65
1.  Income Supports 
 
Income supports differ from price supports because, unlike price 
supports, income supports are not intended to impact production.66  
Rather, income supports are designed to provide farming families 
with incomes comparable to non-farming families.67  The famous 
Brannan Plan of 1949 first conceived of income supports through tar-
get prices,68 which were not implemented until the Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection Act of 1973.69  Crop prices were subsidized by 
the difference between the market price and the price that would 
raise incomes to the level of nonfarm workers, called “parity prices.”70
 
64
Daryll Ray has argued that agricultural production, particularly grain  
production, has a very low response rate to prices.  Daryll E. Ray, Dir., Agric. Policy 
Analysis Ctr., Univ. of Tenn., Testimony Before the Democratic Policy Committee, 
1996 Farm Bill:  A Price Response Experiment 2-4 (Feb. 2, 2000), available at http:// 
www.agpolicy.org/pubs/fbtest0200.PDF.  He attributed this problem to the fact that 
agricultural land remains in production, even when individual farmers go out of busi-
ness, so the overall supply is not significantly affected.  Id. at 1.  Three years later he 
wrote that while the same amount of land remained in production after Canada re-
duced commodity supports by thirty-five percent, the mix of crops grown had changed 
significantly.  RAY ET AL., supra note 
  
15, at 40.  The Canadian outcome is a goal of this 
Comment’s legislative recommendations. 
65
See infra subsection I.B.5 for a discussion of the retreat from reform in the 2002 
and 2008 Farm Bills.  
66
See Olson, supra note 40, at 9 (explaining that an income support would calcu-
late subsidization based on the size of a typical farm family). 
67
Id. 
68
See Reo M. Christenson, THE BRANNAN PLAN:  FARM POLITICS AND POLICY 64 -72 
(1959) for a general discussion of Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan’s reform 
proposals.  The Brannan Plan differed from the 1973 Act in that it sought to expand 
supports beyond the base commodities to include fruits and vegetables.  See Olson, su-
pra note 40, at 9 (discussing direct payments for fruits and vegetables included in the 
Brannan Plan).  The programs imposed limits both on the maximum benefit amount 
and farm size in an effort to direct supports to small family farms.   
69
 Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (codified as amended in scattered sections of  
7 U.S.C.). 
70
Parity prices are a measure of the purchasing power of commodity prices.  Ol-
son, supra note 40, at 1.  Agricultural supports use an index of input costs and consum-
er prices to set target agricultural prices.  Typically, a program will support prices be-
tween seventy and ninety-two percent of parity prices to ensure sufficient income to 
keep a family farm in business.  See, e.g., HURT, supra note 23, at 108 (explaining that 
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Target prices were set at average prices over the previous ten years, 
and when the market price fell below the target price, farmers could 
receive the difference in a “deficiency payment.”71  While deficiency 
payments are no longer in use, target payments are used to calculate 
market loan rates and “countercycle” payments.72  Countercycle pay-
ments are made when market prices fall below target prices.73  Market 
loans are nonrecourse loans74 (the crop serves as collateral) to farmers 
who do not sell at lower prices during harvest time, but keep their 
crop off of the market until prices rise later in the season.75
While these supports are styled as “income” supports, payments 
are still based on the amount of program crops that farmers produce.  
These supports artificially deflate prices because farmers can afford to 
accept prices below the cost of production since the farm programs 
pay them the difference.
 
76  This is a significant contributor to the ex-
plosion of cheap processed foods and meats, as confined animal feed-
ing operations (CAFOs) can purchase feed grains for less than the 
cost of growing and harvesting them.77
 
Secretary Brannan believed this method would encourage farmers to produce at a rate 
that would create ideal commodity prices). 
  Thus, it is more expensive to 
raise animals fed on crops grown on the same farm than it is to raise 
cattle in a confined feedlot with purchased grain.  This increases the 
71
See id. at 133 (explaining that after the initial year, target prices were based on 
the previous year’s target price and adjusted by production levels and an index of in-
put costs).  Deficiency payments were capped at the difference between the target 
price and the nonrecourse loan rate.  Id.  Olson notes that the target price is “referred 
to by some economists as a ‘what ought to be price.’”  Olson, supra note 40, at 13. 
72
See JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 11 (noting significant increases in countercycle 
and market loan supports from the 2002 to the 2008 Farm Bill). 
73
Countercycle payments are calculated by taking the product of the farm’s yield 
under the countercycle payment program, the payment rate, and eighty-five percent of 
the farm’s acreage used to grow base crops .  FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1.  
74
See infra subsection I.B.4 for a complete discussion of nonrecourse loans. 
75
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., MARKETING ASSISTANCE LOANS & LOAN  
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS 1-2 (2008), available at www.usda.gov/documents/Marketing_ 
Assistance_Loans_and_Loan_Deficiency_Payments.pdf.   While a program with the 
name “deficiency payment” still exists, it is a fundamentally different program because 
it is not linked to target prices.  Id. at 1.  Current loan deficiency payments provide 
farmers with a payment to keep their crops off an overcrowded market, instead of us-
ing their crops as collateral in a market loan.  Id. 
76
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 10-11 (showing that corn prices are 23% lower 
than the cost of production and farm payments provide 24% of the farmer’s revenue, 
generating 1% net income on corn production). 
77
 See RAPP, supra note 16, at 31 (“For both crop prices and farm income federal 
subsidies now play the dominant role in determining how much of certain commodi-
ties will be produced and what prices they will bring at market.”). 
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trend toward large industrial farms and away from diverse farms that 
raise both crops and animals.78
Allowing prices to fall without income supports has consistently 
resulted in increased production in the short term as farmers scram-
ble to make up the difference in revenues with greater volume.
 
79  One 
of the reasons that crop prices plummeted in the wake of the 1996 
FAIR Act is that farmers had become significantly invested in mono-
culture80 and could not easily respond to market conditions.81  For ex-
ample, when the FAIR Act sought to decouple price supports from 
production, commodity prices dropped 15.5%, but production of the 
eight major crops only decreased by 3.7% over the same period.82  
Lack of diversification has been identified as a major inhibitor to 
market response, because farms engaged in monoculture cannot re-
spond to a change in price by changing the crops in production.83  
Thus, farmers have continually increased sunk costs in equipment in 
order to decrease per-unit costs, becoming more beholden to the 
same commodities with each capital investment.  The ability of well-
capitalized farms to reduce per unit costs is one of the reasons indus-
trial agriculture has thrived in the past decade.  The fall in price due 
to increased production does not impact the return because farm 
programs guarantee a minimum price.84
 
78
See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 
 
28, at 3 (arguing that large farms generally ben-
efit from policy decisions aimed to assist small farms). 
79
HURT, supra note 23, at 107. 
80
See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 38-40 (discussing the rise of monoculture and its 
impacts on food production and farming practices). 
81
See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 2-4 (describing the economic policies and 
technological advances that lead to the concentration of agriculture in a small number 
of large farms specializing in a small number of crops); see also Mary Clare Ahearn et 
al., How Do Decoupled Payments Affect Resource Allocations Within the Farm Sector?, AMBER 
WAVES, Nov. 2004, at 8, 8 (explaining that government subsidies distort market res-
ponses because farmers do not exclusively consider input costs and market prices, but 
also factor government payments in their production decisions). 
82
Ray, supra note 64, at 1-2. 
83
Cf. RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 4 (explaining that industrial farms are 
highly invested in technology designed for one particular crop). 
84
See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 2 (showing agricultural production 
shifting to larger farms). 
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2.  Acreage Reduction 
The purpose of acreage reduction is to reduce production by con-
trolling a principal agricultural input: land.85  The Agricultural Ad-
justment Act of 1933 sought to reduce the acreage in production 
through voluntary agreements with farmers86 who received payments 
from the Department of Agriculture to reduce the acres on which 
they grew basic crops.87  By 1937 it was clear that reducing acreage did 
not actually reduce the crop supply because farmers increased the 
productivity of the acres remaining in production.88  While there ul-
timately may be some limit on how much corn a farmer can physically 
grow on a single acre of land, farm productivity has continued to in-
crease, with the greatest production per acre in history in 2009.89
 
85
However, increasing other inputs nullifies these efforts.  See, e.g., WAYNE D. 
RASMUSSEN & GLADYS L. BAKER, THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 110 (1972) (“A 
price-support system relying on acreage limitation can be rendered ineffective by 
technological progress.”).   
  Un-
86
The Supreme Court found the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s “coercive” control 
of production, which it considered a purely local concern, to be beyond the scope of 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.  United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1, 63-64 (1936).  In response, the 1936 Soil Conservation Act continued to limit 
acreage on which farmers planted base crops, but did so under the guise of environ-
mental conservation.  See Ch. 104, 49 Stat. 163 (1936) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. § 590) (paying farmers to plant in accordance with “soil conservation” goals, to 
fix nutrients to the soil, and to prevent erosion).  While conservation has become an 
important component of agricultural policy, this Comment discusses these programs 
only as they relate to production controls and income supports. 
87
See WAYNE D. RASMUSSEN ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., AGRIC. INFO. BULLETIN 
NO. 39, A SHORT HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT, 1933–75, at 2 (1976) (de-
scribing the programs implemented by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933).  In 
order to address emergency problems in commodity prices before the legislation took 
effect, the USDA contracted with farmers to plough under crops that had already been 
planted that season and to slaughter sows and cattle.  Id.  This famous event in agricul-
tural history is often portrayed as a gruesome waste, but lost in this narrative is the de-
tail that products including pork, butter, cheese, and flour were given to unemployed 
families struggling to feed themselves during the Great Depression.  Id. 
88
See id. at 4 (explaining that the 1936 drought concealed the increase in produc-
tivity per acre); see also HIGHTOWER, supra note 55, at 1 (noting that agricultural prod-
uctivity increased 330% from 1952 to 1972, compared to manufacturing productivity 
that increased 160% over the same period).  The land retired in conservation or al-
lotment programs is typically the least productive, resulting in more intense produc-
tion on the most productive land.  RASMUSSEN & BAKER, supra note 85, at 110.  The 
only program to focus on actual production levels was the poundage quotas program 
implemented in 1965 for flue-cured tobacco.  Id.  
89
In 2009, corn yield per acre hit an historic high:  165.2 bushels per acre, pro-
ducing 13.2 billion bushels of corn.  See 2009 Crop Year Is One for the Record Books, USDA 
Reports, USDA (Jan. 12, 2010), http://www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/2010/01_ 
12_2010.asp.  These gains in efficiencies resulted from the use of machinery, chemical 
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fortunately, the cost of the additional inputs required to realize such 
yields reduced farm income, even when agricultural prices were soar-
ing in the 1970s.90
3.  Marketing Agreements, Processing Taxes, and  
Licensing Requirements 
 
Marketing agreements, processing taxes, and licensing require-
ments focused on processors and handlers of agricultural commodi-
ties, such as grain elevators and CAFOs.  Legislators targeted commod-
ities requiring processing before human consumption in part because 
the production and distribution process allowed for easy monitoring 
and regulation.91  Marketing agreements went into effect once two-
thirds of processors voted in a referendum to limit the total supply, 
and the government taxed any amount processed above the limit so 
heavily that it was essentially confiscated.92  However, these marketing 
agreements and processing taxes were eliminated after the 1933 Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act was held unconstitutional.  These agreements 
and taxes were a specific target of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Butler.93
 
fertilizers and pesticides, and genetically modified crops that can withstand cold and 
pests.  Id. 
  The Court held that Congress did not have the 
90
See HIGHTOWER, supra note 55, at 4 (explaining that the average debt of a family 
farmer increased 335% between 1952 and 1973).  The 1970 Farm Bill altered the 
acreage reduction requirements for crops, including wheat, by replacing the per-crop 
acreage allotments with a percentage reduction in total cropland.  Agricultural Act of 
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, sec. 402, § 397(c)(b)(1), 84 Stat. 1358, 1362 (1970); see also 
RASMUSSEN & BAKER, supra note 85, at 111 (noting that the bill abolished marketing 
quotas for corn, wheat, and cotton).  Although certain crops, such as rice, peanuts, 
sugar, and tobacco, were still subject to production quotas, the goal was to provide 
farmers with greater flexibility in choosing what to plant.  Id.  However, price supports 
were still calculated using the base crop-—the number of acres the farmer planted of 
the commodity crop, multiplied by the farm’s average productivity per acre.  Olson, 
supra note 40, at 21.  Thus, removing the allotment barrier to planting different crops 
did not affect production because the incentives had not changed.  Id. at 22.  Another 
striking example of this problem is the In-Kind program, which paid farmers to not 
plant 50% to 100% of their crops.  7 C.F.R. §§ 770.1–770.6 (1984).  The program cut 
corn production in half and removed more cropland from use than Western Europe 
planted in 1983.  Olson, supra note 40, at 16.  However, this reduction of supply did 
not help the farm depression.  In 1985 a record number of farmers filed for bankrupt-
cy, sixty-eight agricultural banks failed, and many equipment and chemical suppliers 
went out of business.  Id. 
91
HURT, supra note 23, at 69. 
92
Olson, supra note 40, at 6. 
93
 The Court reasoned, “Congress has no power to enforce its commands on the 
farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act.  It must follow that it 
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authority to impose these taxes under the power to tax and spend be-
cause they were not imposed to generate revenue but were used to 
control supply, which was an exclusively local prerogative.94  While 
Wickard v. Filburn later held that Congress did have authority to regu-
late wheat production, the Court established this authority under the 
Commerce Clause,95 and the taxation method of regulating produc-
tion was not resumed in later years.96
4.  Nonrecourse Loans 
 
Nonrecourse loans are a cornerstone of modern price supports.  
This program creates a price floor by guaranteeing farmers a mini-
mum price for certain commodity crops.97  The Secretary of Agricul-
ture sets loan rates—essentially a target price—for each commodity.98  
When market prices fall below the loan rates, farmers can take out a 
loan from the government for the value of the crop instead of selling 
the crop on the market.99  The crop serves as collateral for the loan, 
and the government has a right to the crops if the farmer fails to repay 
the loan.100
 
may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase com-
pliance.”  297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936). 
  Farmers hold the loan for up to nine months, keeping 
their crops off an overcrowded market until sufficient demand returns 
94
The Court explained, “Congress cannot, under the pretext of executing dele-
gated power, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the Federal 
Government.”  Id. at 69 (quoting Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 17 (1925)). 
95
317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942). 
96
The Soil Conservation Act of 1936 and subsequent farm bills focused on acreage 
reduction and price supports rather than processing fees and production limitations to 
control supply.  See infra Section III.C for a discussion of the possibility of resuming 
processing taxes under the Taxing and Spending or Commerce Clause authority. 
97
Initially, loans supported the prices of corn, cotton, rice, wheat and tobacco.  
RASMUSSEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 6.  The 2008 Farm Bill provided price supports to 
twenty different crops, including soybeans, oilseeds, additional feed grains, wool, dry 
peas, lentils, and the newest crop large chickpeas.  Food, Conservation, and Energy Act 
of 2008 § 1001(4), 7 U.S.C. § 8702(4) (Supp. III 2010).  
98
RASMUSSEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 6. 
99
Olson, supra note 40, at 6-7. 
100 Originally, the federal government stored the collateral crops for only nine 
months.  RAPP, supra note 16, at 35.  If a farmer failed to repay the loan, the govern-
ment retained the commodity as part of the “Ever-Normal Granary” program.  RAS-
MUSSEN ET AL., supra note 87, at 6.  Through this program the federal government 
maintained surplus crops that could be sold to normalize supply when scarcity drove 
up food prices.  Ruth R. Harkin & Thomas R. Harkin, “Roosevelt to Reagan” Commodity 
Programs and the Agriculture and Food Act of 1981, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 499, 501 (1982).  
However, the program was extremely costly—-the government paid over one million 
dollars per day just to store the crops.  HURT, supra note 23, at 123. 
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to drive up prices and warrant the release of more supply.101  Loans 
are typically repaid upon sale at a higher market price.102  This cycle 
creates a price floor by encouraging farmers to store excess supplies 
when prices fall below a certain level.103
The program sought to control prices by both reducing the incen-
tive to sell at plummeting prices and keeping surplus crops off the 
market.  The modern program includes market loans and loan defi-
ciency payments that permit farmers to repay loans at market prices if 
prices are below the loan rate at the time the loan comes due rather 
than forfeit the commodity.
 
104  These programs were continued 
through the 1996 FAIR Act, which sought to transition farmers to the 
free market, but continued the same production incentives by main-
taining loan rates at eighty-five percent parity prices.105
When the Secretary of Agriculture sets a loan rate that exceeds the 
market price a farmer could get for her crops, the only sensible choice 
is to take out a loan.  There is no penalty for defaulting on these 
loans—no negative impact on the farmer’s credit rating or additional 
fees imposed—so the loans function essentially as a sale of the grain to 
the United States government at above-market prices.
 
106  Indeed, 
banks typically require farmers to participate in the farm program to 
qualify for loans to purchase land or equipment because the program 
guarantees a minimum rate of return even if crop prices plummet.107
While nonrecourse loans are referred to as a type of income sup-
port, the purpose of these loans is to control prices by limiting the 
supply on the market.  These loans do not effectively limit supply, be-
cause they create a price floor, encouraging farmers to produce more 
commodity crops because they are guaranteed a minimum price.
 
108  
Farmers are paid by the bushel, so these programs create incentives to 
produce as many bushels per acre as possible regardless of market con-
ditions.  This practice ultimately drives down prices.109
 
101 RAPP, supra note 
  Further, sup-
16, at 35. 
102 Id.  
103
Olson, supra note 40, at 6-7. 
104
See supra subsection I.B.1. 
105
Olson, supra note 40, at 21. 
106
RAPP, supra note 16, at 35. 
107
Id. at 32. 
108
See Olson, supra note 40, at 22 (arguing that price supports create surpluses).  
109
Prices have increased significantly only as a result of global food disasters, such 
as the OPEC embargo combined with famine and drought in the 1970s.  See id. at 13 
(describing the effects of famines in Africa and Asia, a grain deal with the Soviet Un-
ion, and the Arab oil embargo on U.S. food prices).  Commodity  
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porting only base crops promotes excessive production of those com-
modities at the expense of nonsubsidized crops, like fruits and vegeta-
bles.110  As a result, reform advocates have urged Congress to adopt in-
come support programs that are “decoupled” from production.111
5.  Production Flexibility Contracts and Direct Payments 
 
The 1996 FAIR Act attempted to end agricultural production 
payments.112  Also known as the Freedom to Farm Act, the statute 
ended deficiency payments and all supply-management programs 
such as the acreage reduction program and the 50-92 program.113  To 
implement these drastic decreases in farm payments, the statute of-
fered a Production Flexibility Contract, a one-time annual payment 
designed to transition farmers to the free market over the course of 
seven years.114  Ninety-nine percent of eligible farms enrolled, but only 
participants in corn, wheat, cotton, or rice programs in the previous 
five years were eligible.115
The Act based payments on past production with the idea that 
farmers would plant more nonprogram crops like fruits and vegeta-
bles when they transitioned to a free market system.
 
116
 
prices are again rising today due to drought in Russia, floods in Australia, and political 
unrest in the Middle East.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Campbell, Record Beef Price Gains as  
Corn Cost Slows Feedlot Cattle Buying, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2011, 9:00 PM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-18/record-beef-price-gains-as-corn-cost-slows-
feedlot-cattle-buying.html (reporting that grain prices increased by seventy-three per-
cent over the last year and corn futures had the biggest gain in five months). 
  Importantly, 
110
See Olson, supra note 40, at 22-23 (explaining why farmers have little incentive 
to grow crops that do not have price supports). 
111
See, e.g., Mary E. Burfisher & Jeffrey Hopkins, Farm Payments:  Decoupled Payments 
Increase Households’ Well-Being, Not Production, AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2003, at 39, 41 (show-
ing that farm families who received decoupled payments during the 1996 FAIR Act had 
greater disposable income); Olson, supra note 40, at 28 (arguing that farmers should 
not receive payments based on the volume they produced, but should be provided with 
the “amount necessary to guarantee a farm family a basic minimum income in times of 
low crop or low livestock prices”). 
112
See HURT, supra note 23, at 152 (contending that policymakers believed price 
supports and acreage reduction programs were the cause of surplus production, ver-
tical integration, and rural poverty).  
113
See Olson, supra note 40, at 20-21 (describing the abolishment of various pay-
ment structures under the FAIR Act). 
114
7 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006); see also HURT, supra note 23, at 152 (explaining how the 
FAIR Act provided for a systematic reduction in payments to farmers over seven years). 
115
Olson, supra note 40, at 20-21. 
116
See Edwin Young & Dennis A. Shields, 1996 FAIR Act Frames Farm Policy for 7 
Years, AGRIC. OUTLOOK, Apr. 1996, at 1, 1 (“Farmers will have much greater flexibility 
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eligibility was based on historic participation in farm programs, and 
was not dependent on future planting choices.117  Since payments did 
not depend on the amount produced, these were called “decoupled” 
payments.  Similarly, direct payments, which continue today, were de-
signed to encourage farmers to respond to market conditions rather 
than support programs, but eligibility for such payments is still de-
pendent on base-crop acreage.118
Decoupling payments from production levels was not successful in 
the 1996 FAIR Act, because the reduction in deficiency payments was 
made up in market loan and nonrecourse loan payments, which were 
dependent on production levels.
 
119  Indeed, from 1996 to 2002, when 
income supports comprised two-thirds of farm payments maintaining 
the same production incentives, the contract payments constituted a 
small portion of overall farm payments.120  Further, conservation 
measures continued acreage-reduction payments, which were contin-
gent on base-crop acreage, so the incentives to overproduce the eight 
major commodities did not change.121  The 1996 Act was further un-
dermined by emergency payments to compensate for natural disasters 
and price collapses.122
 
to make planting decisions . . . .”).  However, the FAIR Act did in fact impose planting 
restrictions on fruits and vegetables.  Id. 
  Contract payments were scheduled to end in 
117
Id. at 1-2. 
118
FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1. 
119
In 1999 the government spent $5 billion on nonrecourse loans.  HURT, supra 
note 23, at 167. Essentially, market loans replaced the portion of farm income defi-
ciency payments that the government provided before 1996.  See Ahearn et al., supra 
note 81, at 9 (graphing the proportion of farm payments from 1991 through 2001 to 
show the decrease in deficiency and diversion payments in favor of increasing market 
loan benefits); see also Olson, supra note 40, at 21 (arguing that the failure to decouple 
these other income supports negated the impact of eliminating price supports).   
120
Burfisher & Hopkins, supra note 111, at 40. 
121
As Allen Olson explains,  
By providing larger income subsidies for program crops than for other crops 
or livestock, the 1996 farm bill encouraged farmers to keep growing the same 
crops they had been growing for years.  By 2000, surpluses were again a major 
problem.  Like other farm bills, the 1996 legislation interfered with the opera-
tion of a free market. 
Olson, supra note 40, at 24.   
 To be eligible for the Conservation Reserve Program, a farmer must have planted 
base crops in at least four out of the six years between 1996 and 2001.  TADLOCK CO-
WAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21613, CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM:  STATUS 
AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2010). 
122
However, only ten percent of farms received emergency payments, including 
farms owned by Ted Turner, Rockefeller heirs, and wealthy members of Congress who 
passed the bill.  HURT, supra note 23, at 166-167.  
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2002, but the farm bill passed in that year reinstituted price supports 
and subsidy payments.123
C.  Current Status of Agricultural Production Legislation 
 
The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 and the 2002 
Farm Bill,124 both of which perpetuated the same mechanisms of price 
control through target prices, countercycle payments, and nonre-
course loans, replaced the FAIR ACT.  The scope of these price sup-
ports has not extended beyond the core group of base crops, although 
some legumes and chickpeas are now supported.125  No direct aid is 
provided to producers of fruits and vegetables.126  In fact, farmers lose 
eligibility for nonrecourse loans and conservation programs if they 
plant fruits and vegetables instead of program crops, because only 
program crops count in the base-acreage calculation used for these 
benefits.127  Most importantly, income supports primarily appear in 
the form of nonrecourse loans, which encourage increasing commod-
ity production and discourage product diversification.128  Thus, the 
largest farms are increasingly the largest beneficiaries of farm pro-
grams because the Farm Bill bases payments on the number of pro-
ductive acres and historic yields.129
 
123
This support continued through the 2008 Farm Bill, which defines “base acres” 
as “the number of acres established under section 7911 of this title as in effect on Sep-
tember 30, 2007, subject to any adjustment under section 8711 of this title.”  7 U.S.C 
§ 8702(2)(A) (Supp. III 2010).  However, decoupled income supports have been con-
tinued in the form of “direct payments.”  Id. § 8702(5). 
  Current agricultural legislation 
encourages farmers to plant as many acres of commodity crops as 
possible, regardless of the market price, because the government will 
make up the difference.  This incentive has driven commodity prices 
124
Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 
134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 16, and 21 U.S.C.). 
125
See JOHNSON, supra note 54, at 11 (noting that in 2009 dry peas, lentils, and large 
and small chickpeas were to become eligible for countercycle payments).  
126
In fact, fruit and vegetable producers are not eligible for the same disaster re-
lief as farmers who grow commodity crops.  ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE 
2012 FARM BILL:  AN OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT FARMERS AND PROMOTE PUBLIC 
HEALTH 1 (2010), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/20100803flag.pdf. 
127
See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 4 (explaining that farms that planted 
fruits and vegetables on base acres from 1991 to 2001, excluding 1996 and 1997, may 
plant nonprogram crops, but that a farm without a history of planting program corps 
violated its contract for direct and countercycle payments and would be penalized for 
each acre on which it grew fruits and vegetables). 
128
Id. at 10. 
129
See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 1 (“Commodity program payments 
shifted sharply to higher income households between 1989 and 2003.”). 
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down, resulting in artificially inexpensive processed foods, while the 
cost of produce has increased forty percent over the same period.130
II.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FARM BILL 
  
Federal farm programs make it more expensive for consumers to pur-
chase and consume healthy food. 
Agricultural policy is a story of incentives for both producers and 
consumers.  Most agricultural legislation has focused on influencing 
producers, although the successful discouragement of tobacco use is a 
striking example of legislation impacting consumer behavior.  To ad-
dress the obesity epidemic, agricultural legislation must do both. 
In order to enable consumers to afford healthier foods while main-
taining a strong domestic agricultural system, the 2012 Farm Bill must 
consider the actual incentives it creates and use those incentives to sup-
port producers and consumers who are both suffering under the cur-
rent system.  Since price supports and acreage allotments have resulted 
in increased surpluses and decreased prices, these legislative measures 
should not be perpetuated.  Further, income supports that are tied to 
levels of production have the same effects as price supports.  Income 
supports should be decoupled from production.  Promoting diversifica-
tion of agricultural production will stabilize farm income without addi-
tional government spending.  Finally, the new bill should encourage 
processors to consider the health impact of their products by imposing 
a graded tax, modeled after the tobacco tax system. 
A.  End Price Supports 
Acreage reduction, nonrecourse loans, and deficiency payments 
have not met their aim of increasing long-term crop prices.131  Econ-
omists have demonstrated that commodity subsidies, instead of bols-
tering prices to support domestic agriculture, actually depress farm 
prices by at least twenty percent.132
 
130
 The real cost of fruits and vegetables has risen forty percent since 1985, while 
soda, fats, and oils have deceased in price.  SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 
  Further, price supports create a 
perverse incentive to invest exclusively in program crops because they 
3, at  
6-7.  The decreasing cost of commodities like corn and soybeans has made “sugars and 
fats some of the cheapest food substances to produce.”  Id. 
131
See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 8 fig.2 (showing that crop prices have on aver-
age declined about forty percent). 
132
See id. at 10 (demonstrating that market prices for corn, soybeans, cotton, and 
rice were between twenty-three and fifty-two percent below cost of production in 2001).   
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guarantee a minimum return when prices collapse.133
Ending price supports is the simplest legal measure,
  A better way to 
protect farm income against market fluctuations is through decoupled 
income supports and encouragement of diversification of agricultural 
products. 
134 but this ap-
proach was unsuccessful in the 1996 FAIR Act.  The 1996 Act attempted 
to transition farmers to the free market through an annual income 
support payment, but the legislation maintained other forms of support 
tied to production.135
Decoupled income supports can provide the appropriate safety net 
for farmers in difficult times without significantly influencing farmers’ 
crop-selection decisions.
  In order to effectively end price supports, all farm 
payments must be decoupled from production. 
136
Other nations have successfully supported robust agricultural 
production after eliminating price supports.  In 1995, Canada elimi-
nated thirty-five percent of all commodity supports, which resulted in 
a significant change in the mix of crops planted, including a twenty-
three percent decline in wheat, Canada’s principal crop.
  Income supports can thus avert the short-
term consequence of eliminating price supports, because farmers do 
not have to outproduce one another for marginal returns, and can in-
stead focus on crops that have higher market prices.  This in turn bol-
sters market prices for commodity crops by reducing the supply. 
137  While the 
total land in production did not change significantly, the prices and 
quantity of individual crops did change.138
 
133
See RAPP, supra note 
  Similarly, Australia was no 
longer able to support its primary agricultural product, wool, in 
16, at 35 (describing how nonrecourse loans effectively set 
a price floor on commodities). 
134
The political challenges of ending price supports present a more difficult ques-
tion beyond the scope of this Comment.  Recently, significant support for farm pro-
grams has come from urban representatives whose constituents receive nutrition pro-
gram benefits.  Olson, supra note 40, at 12.  Olson suggested that the Food Stamp Act’s 
incorporation in the 1962 Farm Bill brought urban support for agricultural benefits.  
Id.  Since obesity disproportionately impacts low-income urban residents, there may be 
room for political consensus on reform, particularly in a time of sharp budget cuts 
when other entitlement programs may be reduced.  See, e.g., Joe Davidson, Making 
Smart Budget Cuts, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2011, at B4 (reporting on recommendations 
to more effectively cut budgets of federal agencies).   
135
7 U.S.C. §§ 7211, 7231 (2006). 
136
See FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1 (“Because direct payments provide 
no incentive to increase production of any particular crop, the payments support farm 
income without distorting producers’ current production decisions.”). 
137
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 40. 
138
Id. 
FOSTER_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2011  12:58 PM 
258 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 235 
1991.139  The number of sheep declined by thirty-one percent, but ra-
ther than go out of business, farmers began to plant crops to maintain 
income.140
B.  Decouple Income Supports from Production Capacity 
  These experiences indicate that farmers are capable of ad-
justing to market conditions, but they cannot do so when other com-
ponents of farm programs require continued production of base 
crops to receive benefits. 
Currently, the highest-grossing farms are the greatest beneficiaries 
of farm payments.141  Deficiency payments are intended to serve as in-
come supports but in fact work on a base-acreage system, meaning 
that larger farms benefit more, and farmers who use base acres to 
plant nonprogram crops are penalized.142  This creates a strong incen-
tive to plant the same crops and to accept marginal returns because 
government programs guarantee a return when the increase in input 
costs outpaces commodity prices.  Further, countercycle payments are 
based on average per-acre yields.143  The USDA calculates countercycle 
payments based on the number of acres per farm and the expected 
average yield per acre.144
To maintain a robust national agricultural system, Allen Olson has 
suggested providing a minimum guaranteed income to family farms, 
regardless of the quantity of program crops produced.
  Thus, the farmer who can increase yield per 
acre above that average will receive both the value that the govern-
ment estimates the crop should be sold at and the market value of the 
crop that is actually produced. 
145
 
139
Id. at 41.   
  Under Ol-
son’s scheme, farm payments would supplement the difference be-
tween the family’s income and a $50,000 to $75,000 target income for 
families actively engaged in farming.  This plan is limited to estab-
lished farms and excludes hobby farmers, absentee owners, landlords, 
140
Id.  While Professor Ray describes this incident as a failure of eliminating price 
supports, such a diversification of agriculture is precisely what this Comment advo-
cates.  Indeed, this example shows that farmers can transition to different modes of 
production when faced with falling income. 
141
See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 38, at 3 (showing that farms with sales over 
half a million dollars were the largest recipient of commodity payments in 2003). 
142
See 7 U.S.C. § 8702 (Supp. III 2010) (defining base acres as acres where pro-
gram crops were grown in previous years). 
143
Olson, supra note 40, at 21. 
144
FARM SERV. AGENCY, supra note 60, at 1. 
145
Olson, supra note 40, at 28. 
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and speculators.146  Eliminating incentives to produce program crops, 
would give farmers greater liberty to diversify production, particularly 
if polyculture were independently encouraged.  Further, structuring 
income supports around minimum household needs benefits small 
family farms at the expense of high-grossing industrial farmers.147
C.  Promote Polyculture 
  
When farm income is no longer tied to producing program crops, 
farmers can focus on higher-value crops, such as fruits and vegetables.  
The increased production of fruits and vegetables will in turn make 
produce more affordable for consumers. 
Distributing risk among a variety of crops reduces the overall im-
pact of a price decline in any single product.148  Diversification reduces 
reliance on commodity crops and, in turn, reduces the need for income 
supports when prices for those crops collapse.149  In fact, price supports 
are linked to the rise of monoculture when farmers shifted from rotat-
ing fields through a five-year period to cycling between just corn and 
soybeans.150
 
146
Id. 
  This exclusive production of program crops exacerbated 
147
Being well capitalized, large industrial farms are more wedded to monoculture 
and focus on increasing production per acre to increase returns.  RAY & SCHAFFER, su-
pra note 28, at 4.  These efficiencies of industrial agriculture can only be realized in a 
monoculture operation, because reducing per unit cost is dependent on producing 
more units of the same crop.  See id.  at 3-4 (explaining that significant capital expendi-
tures in inputs encourage expanding production and acreage because these fixed costs 
reduce operating expenditures, pushing down the per-unit cost of production while 
also driving down price at a rate that often outpaces reductions in production costs).  
148
See, e.g., Shiva S. Makki et al., Decoupled Payments and Farmers’ Production Decisions 
Under Risk, in AGRIC. ECON. REP. NO. 838, DECOUPLED PAYMENTS IN A CHANGING POLI-
CY SETTING 33, 34 (Mary E. Burfisher & Jeffrey Hopkins eds., 2004) (discussing how 
farmers use diversification as a risk-management tool). 
149
Not every region is capable of supporting diverse crops, however.  For example, 
many wheat farmers do not have the option of switching to soy or corn because the 
high plains region will not support those plants.  RAPP, supra note 16, at 32-33.  How-
ever, farmers in those regions could at a minimum pasture goats or raise chickens to 
decrease dependence on commodity crops.  Ending price supports that enable feed-
lots to purchase grain below the cost of production would promote an economically 
feasible agricultural model.  Diversifying agricultural production with animal husban-
dry would also challenge the dominance of the confined animal feedlot system, which 
has been highly criticized for environmental degradation, animal abuse, and an unba-
lanced diet focusing excessively on meat products.  See, e.g., Bittman, supra note 18 (“It 
would be hard to devise a more wasteful, damaging, unsustainable system.”). 
150
RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 1. 
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the surplus problem once the export boom of the 1970s subsided.151  
Further, input costs have exceeded prices, reducing farm income.152  
Polyculture reduces the need for inputs such as chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, and patented genetically modified seeds because cycling soil 
through different uses replenishes nutrients, inhibits annual pests, and 
improves plant health.153
Congress can encourage polyculture by eliminating acreage limits 
on nonprogram crops, such as fruits and vegetables,
  Thus, polyculture reduces dependence on a 
single volatile crop market, and increases a farmer’s net income by re-
ducing input costs.  Moreover, diversifying agricultural production may 
increase the supply of fruits and vegetables while decreasing the supply 
of commodity crops, adjusting their prices accordingly. 
154 and providing 
incentives similar to those used in conservation measures.155  Just as 
farmers are paid “rents” to retire crop acres to conservation uses, far-
mers could be paid for the percentage of acreage that is dedicated to 
more than two different agricultural uses (such as grain crops and li-
vestock).  Second, the concept of “base crops” should be eliminated.  
One of the most significant impediments to diversification is the Farm 
Bill’s exclusive focus on commodity crops.  Everything from conserva-
tion program eligibility to income supports are calculated based on 
acreage dedicated to growing commodity crops.156  All acreage used 
for agricultural production should be counted for farm program ben-
efits.  To avoid overinclusion, programs may limit benefits to house-
holds whose primary income is derived from farming.157
 
151
See, e.g., RAPP, supra note 
  These re-
16, at 14 (noting that since the 1980s, farm programs 
have been the third largest domestic spending item).  From the origination of the pro-
gram through 1960, government payments never exceeded ten percent of farm in-
come.  Id. at 15. 
152
RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 9. 
153
This is not to suggest that polyculture and organic farming are synonymous.  
Rather, most organic farms are polycultured because it enables them to farm effective-
ly without chemicals.  See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 196-97 (explaining how biodiversity 
reduces the need for farm inputs, and even labor, by maximizing automated processes 
of nature, such as photosynthesis).   
154
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 23. 
155
See SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 3, at 4 (recommending policies that 
reward production of organic products, and promote perennial agriculture). 
156
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 34, at 4. 
157
Legislatures face challenges in crafting provisions to limit benefits to farming 
families because self-employed farmers increasingly supplement household income with 
nonfarm work. See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 28, at 3 (estimating that farmers spend up 
to forty hours working off the farm on nights and weekends to increase household in-
come).  Some farming families may be excluded if benefits are underinclusive.   
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forms would enable farmers to diversify production without losing the 
safety net of federal income supports in lean years. 
D.  Amend Conservation Program Benefit Calculations 
Conservation programs should credit all acreage used in produc-
tion, including land that farmers rotate out of production.  This pro-
posal would address the conservation programs that attempt to impact 
supply but often result in encouraging more intensive use of the same 
acreage.158  Indeed, some  conservation programs may ultimately harm 
the environment because farmers increase inputs such as chemical fer-
tilizers and pesticides to generate the same yield from fewer acres.159  
As American farmers came to understand during the Dust Bowl, con-
servation measures are essential to preserving agriculture, as well as to 
protecting humans and wildlife who suffer from pollution and envi-
ronmental degradation.160  However, the way that program benefits are 
currently calculated inhibits diversification of agricultural opera-
tions.161  The 1996 FAIR Act demonstrated this problem when Con-
gress’s goal to increase market response was thwarted by conservation 
benefits and income support programs that retained dependence on 
program crops.162
E.  Influence Consumer Choice 
  Thus, it is essential to revise conservation program 
benefits calculations so that commodities reforms may be effective. 
Congress should impose a graded excise tax on the least healthy 
products, such as those that contain trans fats, hydrogenated oils, in-
gredients produced in a laboratory rather than on a farm, and prod-
ucts that have insufficient nutrients relative to the amount of calories 
for a balanced diet.163
 
158
See Christopher R. Kelley, Rethinking the Equities of Federal Farm Programs, 14 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 659, 661 (1994) (explaining that conservationists are concerned with 
federal programs that result in greater use of environmentally degrading chemicals). 
  The goal of this tax would be to increase the 
relative expense of these products to enable consumers to make food 
choices that are more beneficial to their health while remaining with-
159
See POLLAN, supra note 18, at 42 (“Before synthetic fertilizers the amount of ni-
trogen in the soil strictly limited the amount of corn an acre of land could support.”). 
160
Cf. HURT, supra note 23, at 84-85 (noting that the first conservation programs 
were initiated to protect farms rather than ecology). 
161
See RAPP, supra note 16, at 85-86 (explaining that conservation programs illu-
strate the federal government’s assumption of a significant regulatory role).  
162
Olson, supra note 40, at 21. 
163
See MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD:  AN EATER’S MANIFESTO 64 (2008). 
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in their budget.  Clinical studies show that altering the price of foods 
significantly impacts consumer food choices.164  In addition, proces-
sors would be encouraged to reconsider the nutritional value of the 
food they create.  This concept is similar to the taxation of tobacco 
products that has been very successful in reducing smoking in the 
United States.165  Processors would also be encouraged to reconsider 
the nutritional value of the food they create and to find innovative 
new ways to make whole foods less expensive and more convenient.166  
Merely adding vitamins and minerals to processed foods, such as cal-
cium-enriched cereal, does not achieve this goal.167
Similar to tobacco use, highly processed foods impose functional 
negative externalities on all Americans.
 
168
 
164
See SCHOONOVER & MULLER, supra note 
  The additional health care 
costs due to the excessive consumption of these foods is paid for 
through public benefits programs like Medicare and Medicaid, 
3, at 8 (commenting on studies that 
found reducing food prices by a small amount significantly impacted consumer 
choice); Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (pointing to studies where re-
searchers observed changes in food choice based on changing prices in a vending ma-
chine).  Nutritional science is still developing, and the definition of “healthy food” is 
still evolving; however, unprocessed foods are healthier than processed foods, even 
when those processed foods have vitamins and minerals added to the final product.  
See, e.g., POLLAN, supra note 163, at 76 (“The uncomfortable fact is that the entire field 
of nutritional science rests on a foundation of ignorance and lies about the most basic 
question of nutrition:  What are people eating?”). 
165
See Gary S. Backer et al., An Empirical Analysis of Cigarette Addiction, 84 AM. ECON. 
REV. 396, 396 (1994) (concluding that a 10% permanent increase in cigarette prices 
reduces consumption by 4% in the short run and 7.5% in the long run). 
166
This is a current trend in some large companies, such as McDonald’s, which is 
now offering an oatmeal product, and Wal-Mart, which pledged to reduce sugar, satu-
rated fats, and sodium in its processed foods.  See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Wal-Mart 
Takes a Healthy Turn, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, at B1 (describing Wal-Mart’s five-year 
plan to reduce the amount of sodium, sugar, and hydrogenated oils in its processed 
foods—-mirroring a pledge by ConAgra to reduce these unhealthy components in its 
processed foods).  However, many of these attempts are rooted in marketing goals, ra-
ther than nutritional science.  For example, McDonald’s oatmeal product “contains 
more sugar than a Snickers bar and only 10 fewer calories than a McDonald’s cheese-
burger or Egg McMuffin.”  Mark Bittman, How to Make Oatmeal . . . Wrong, N.Y. TIMES 
OPINIONATOR (Feb. 22, 2011, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/ 
02/22/how-to-make-oatmeal-wrong.     
167
For example, Michael Pollan has written on studies showing that beta-carotene 
supplements do not have the same health benefits as carrots.  See POLLAN, supra note 
163, at 64. 
168
 That is not to suggest that McDonald’s should be prohibited from selling junk 
food.  This Comment merely asserts that the federal government should not directly 
subsidize the principal inputs of unhealthy foods and suggests taxing these foods to 
reflect their true cost.  
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through higher health insurance premiums, and through higher fees 
charged by hospitals to cover emergency treatment of the uninsured.169
Processors such as McDonald’s, ConAgra, and Kraft Foods do not 
bear the health costs of their products.  Instead these health costs are 
paid for by consumers, taxpayers, and the insured.
 
170  While federal 
courts consistently dismiss claims against McDonald’s for imposing 
health costs on consumers, these opinions are principally based on 
the contention that consumers know, or should know, that fast food 
has health risks, so the consumers assumed these risks when choosing 
to eat at McDonald’s.171  The problem is that even for an informed 
consumer the choice is skewed because the food is artificially inex-
pensive.  If consumers were presented with the actual cost of the food 
at the time of purchase, it would be much easier to make informed 
eating decisions.172  In the long run, an 800-calorie candy bar costs 
much more than the $1 sticker price.173
Two concerns arise when proposing measures to selectively in-
crease food prices.  First, increasing food prices could hurt low-
income families who are already food insecure.
 
174
 
169
 See Finkelstein et al., supra note 
  For example, advo-
4, at w828 (describing how health care costs are 
spread across the population).  Absent insurance and public benefits individual, con-
sumers could be expected to bear the entire cost of their food choices.  However, indi-
rect costs due to reduced productivity, increased disability, and the use of limited health 
care services to treat obesity, heart disease, and diabetes would still impact all Americans. 
170
The direct health care costs of obesity are estimated at $147 billion per year, 
which are paid by consumers who need the medical treatment, taxpayers who fund 
Medicaid and Medicare, and those with health insurance who pay higher insurance 
premiums in order to cover medical costs of those who develop obesity-related condi-
tions.  Id.  Beyond these direct costs, there are also indirect costs due to lost productivi-
ty and the decline in the quality of life of those impacted by the abundance of artifi-
cially inexpensive junk food.  See id. at w831 (asserting that reforms to address these 
indirect costs “will require policy and environmental changes that extend far beyond 
what can be achieved through changes in health care financing and delivery”). 
171
See, e.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 541-42 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (finding that because the dangers of McDonald’s food are “open and obvious,” 
McDonald’s could not be liable for failure to warn).  But cf. Reyes v. McDonald’s Corp., 
Nos. 06-1604, 06-2813, 2006 WL 3253579, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2006) (denying a mo-
tion to dismiss Reyes’ a claim that McDonald’s fraudulently advertised false caloric and 
fat content information for its french fries, inducing Reyes to consume french fries 
more frequently than she would have with the correct information).  
172
See Drewnowski & Specter, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that price can have a 
significant impact on consumer choice). 
173
Cf. K.M. Venkat Narayan et al., Lifetime Risk for Diabetes Mellitus in the United 
States, 290 JAMA 1884, 1887-88 (2003) (estimating that the lifetime risk of diagnosed 
diabetes in the United States is about one in three for men and two in five for women). 
174
USDA data shows that low-income households spend nearly forty percent of 
their income on food, while high-income households spend only nine percent of their 
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cates for the poor were highly critical of New York Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg’s proposed pilot program prohibiting the purchase of so-
da with food stamps.175  Increasing food prices is a serious problem for 
low-income families and the goal of these legislative recommendations 
is to make healthy food choices more affordable.176  An increase in the 
production of fruits, vegetables, and whole grains will reduce their 
cost just as excessive production of commodity crops has reduced the 
cost of those food products.  Moreover, additional food stamp benefits 
could be provided with funds not spent on crop subsidies or with rev-
enues from taxing highly processed foods.177
It is true that soda and potato chips will become more expensive: 
that is the goal.  Soda and fried foods are luxury items to be enjoyed 
infrequently but have become integrated into the basic American di-
et.
 
178  The long-term objective is to use pricing to reflect the fact that 
soda and french fries are luxury foods, not staples of a daily diet.179
 
income on food.  Elizabeth Frazão et al., Converging Patterns in Global Food Consumption 
and Food Delivery Systems, AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2008, at 22, 24.   
  
Thus, individuals who choose to continue to consume principally 
these foods will face higher food prices, just as those who continue to 
smoke cigarettes face higher tobacco prices.  The purpose of this rec-
175
See Anemona Hartocollis, Food Stamps as New Front in Soda Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
7, 2010, at A1 (reporting that advocates were concerned food stamp beneficiaries were 
being singled out in a stigmatizing fashion and suggesting an educational program to 
reduce soda consumption).  The proposed legislation seeks to avoid that pitfall.  How-
ever, low-income people will face more food choice constraints as highly processed 
food becomes more expensive. 
176
If this goal is realized, then low-income families will spend less money on 
health care, ideally saving money in the long-run.  See Sherry et al., supra note 4, at 952 
(noting that obese adults are “at increased risk for many serious health conditions,” 
which will result in an estimated cost of billions of dollars). 
177
Researchers have found that simply increasing food stamp benefits does not 
increase fruit and vegetable consumption and have suggested supplemental vouchers 
or coupons that can only be spent on fruits and vegetables.  JOANNE F. GUTHRIE ET AL., 
ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 29-1, CAN FOOD 
STAMPS DO MORE TO IMPROVE FOOD CHOICES? 3 (2007). 
178
In food surveys Americans report spending most of their money on items the 
USDA labels “other foods,” including, processed foods, condiments, desserts, nonal-
coholic beverages, and snacks.  ELIZABETH FRAZAO ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., 
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 29-4, FOOD SPENDING PATTERNS OF LOW-
INCOME HOUSEHOLDS:  WILL INCREASING PURCHASING POWER RESULT IN HEALTHIER 
FOOD CHOICES? 2 fig.1 (2007).  
179
This Comment does not propose regulating the sale of processed foods, but 
rather questions the wisdom of spending billions of dollars directly subsidizing its cost. 
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ommendation is to make whole foods less expensive and more afford-
able for all families.180
The second objection questions the role of government in shap-
ing consumer attitudes toward food.
 
181  Political commentators such as 
Julie Grunlock have voiced opposition to Michelle Obama’s “Let’s 
Move!” campaign because they believe parents should be free to make 
food choices for their children without government interference.182  
Grunlock contends that parents can be educated on healthy and un-
healthy foods and then make decisions that are best for their own 
families.183  However, a recent study found that calorie information 
posted on a restaurant menu under new laws had no impact on food 
choice.184  The relative price of foods has been found to significantly 
impact food choice.185
If critics like Grunlock are correct, then reversing the current in-
centive structure of food, where the least expensive food is the least 
healthy, will enable consumers to make food choices based on their 
family’s nutritional needs, rather than just its budget.
  Moreover, the government already significantly 
impacts consumption by directly subsidizing certain foods, and regu-
lating the consumption of tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics. 
186
 
180
While food prices have been increasing over the course of 2011, soda is not 
properly characterized as “food.”  The stigma that Mayor Bloomberg’s plan imposes on 
food stamp recipients is problematic, but limiting overall access to soda is not.  This goal 
is also no more paternalistic than limiting consumers’ access to cigarettes.  Just like to-
bacco products, all Americans end up paying for the ill effects of poor food. 
  This pro-
posed legislation will level the price-per-calorie playing field to pro-
181
This objection loses force since the government currently plays an important role 
in food choice by subsidizing the production of certain foods.  Further, consumer choice 
is more directly impacted through regulation of tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics.  Finally, 
the federal government actively markets certain food products directly to consumers. 
182
Julie Grunlock, Federalizing Fat, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 9, 2010, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229099/federalizing-fat/julie-gunlock. 
183
Id. 
184
See Brian Elbel, Calorie Labeling and Food Choices:  A First Look at the Effects On 
Low-Income People in New York City, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1110, w1117 (2009), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/6/w1110.full.pdf+html (finding no evi-
dence that menu labeling influenced the total number of calories purchased). 
185
See Neil Gandal & Anastasia Shabelansky, Obesity and Price Sensitivity at the  
Supermarket, 13 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y no. 2, 2010, at 4, http:// 
www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1191&context=fhep (concluding that 
price sensitivity is the most important factor in food choice). 
186
A twenty percent increase in the price of beverages with added sugars could re-
duce the percentage of at-risk-of-overweight and overweight American children by five 
and three percent, respectively.  TRAVIS A. SMITH ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., TAXING CALORIC SWEETENED BEVERAGES:  POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON BE-
VERAGE CONSUMPTION, CALORIE INTAKE, AND OBESITY, at iii-iv (2010). 
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vide consumers with a more viable option:  comparing apples to ap-
ples, rather than apples to subsidized corn chips. 
III.  LEGAL HURDLES TO IMPLEMENTING REFORM RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are three possible constitutional objections to these rec-
ommendations.187  First, eliminating commodity price supports would 
function as a revocation of entitlements to government benefits sub-
ject to due process requirements.188  Second, regulating the use of 
agricultural land may rise to the level of a regulatory taking if the reg-
ulation sufficiently impacts the value of the property.189  Finally, re-
forms may be beyond Congress’s authority to regulate interstate 
commerce.190  When the Supreme Court invalidated the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 in Butler, it found the act’s production tax and 
payments for acreage reduction to be “coercive” uses of the power to 
tax and spend.191  The more recent holdings in Lopez and Morrison raise 
new concerns about the scope of Congress’s Article I authority.192
A.  Due Process Challenges to Proposed Legislation 
 
Price supports are an entitlement program, similar to social secu-
rity and welfare:  an individual who qualifies for benefits has a right to 
those benefits.  In Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court held that the 
Fifth Amendment prohibits deprivation of rights to government bene-
fits without due process.193
 
187
These objections are in addition to the political hurdles beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
  The defendants in Goldberg conceded that 
the plaintiff had a property interest in welfare benefits under the So-
188
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1970) (requiring the Social Security 
Administration to provide an oral hearing prior to terminating disability benefits). 
189
See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (deny-
ing the claim that restrictions on the construction of a fifty-story office tower on top of 
Grand Central Station constituted a taking because it did not deprive the property of 
all economic use, was for a legitimate public purpose, and did not interfere with a rea-
sonable investment-backed expectation). 
190
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1936) (declaring the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 unconstitutional because agricultural production is exclusively 
a local concern). 
191
Id.  
192
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (striking down the Vi-
olence Against Women Act as beyond Commerce Clause authority because it regulated 
noncommercial activity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (finding the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). 
193
 397 U.S. at 261-62. 
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cial Security Act.194  Not until Board of Regents v. Roth did the Court de-
termine that government benefits constitute a property right when an 
individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement grounded in a non-
constitutional source of law.195  Although Roth failed to demonstrate 
that he was entitled to a renewed teaching contract,196 the plaintiff in 
the companion case Perry v. Sindermann showed sufficient evidence 
that there may have been a tacit system of tenure, creating an implicit 
right to entitlement.197  Since Goldberg, courts have recognized gov-
ernment entitlements as property, and if plaintiffs meet the Roth legi-
timate claim of entitlement standard, the revocation or denial of an 
entitlement creates due process concerns.198
While Goldberg rested on a statutory entitlement, the Roth court 
held that any nonconstitutional source of law could provide a basis for 
a legitimate claim for entitlement.
 
199
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims 
upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbi-
trarily undermined.  It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing 
to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.
  The Roth holding emphasized 
the issue of reliance: 
200
Sindermann echoed the importance of reasonable reliance by 
holding that no written rule or law is required to give rise to a legiti-
mate claim of entitlement, so long as there is a clear expectation justi-
fied by the circumstances.
 
201
 
194
See id. (“Appellant does not contend that procedural due process is not appli-
cable to the termination of welfare benefits.  Such benefits are a matter of entitlement 
for persons qualified to receive them.”).   
  This standard opens the door to a poten-
tial challenge by farmers who have relied on federal farm payments to 
supplement their income.  For many farms, agricultural supports con-
195
See 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“To have a property interest in a benefit, a person 
clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it . . . . He must, instead, 
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”).  
196
Id. at 578. 
197
408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972). 
198
The Court in Roth distinguished between statutory and constitutional grounds 
for entitlements in rejecting Roth’s argument that his entitlement was grounded in  
the First Amendment right to free speech (he was allegedly fired for speaking out  
against the school’s administration).  408 U.S. at 575 n.14.  The Court explained that 
“[w]hatever may be a teacher’s rights of free speech, the interest in holding a teaching 
job at a state university, simpliciter, is not itself a free speech interest.”  Id. 
199
Id. at 577. 
200
Id. 
201
408 U.S. at 602-03. 
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stitute the majority of household income.202  Could this be sufficient 
reliance to warrant procedural safeguards? 203
Goldberg illustrates the potential consequences of repealing a statu-
tory benefits program.  While a tacit entitlement can create a property 
right under Sindermann, the repeal of the program altogether elimi-
nates the basis for that property right—whether it is the termination 
of a de facto tenure program or the repeal of entitlements issued 
through the Social Security Act or the Farm Bill.
 
204  For example the 
Social Security Act was amended to increase the retirement age at 
which individuals recieve full benefits.205  Younger workers had no 
claim to entitlement because the statute no longer provided them 
with a right to benefits.206  Similarly, when the FAIR Act ended price 
supports through deficiency payments, due process issues did not in-
validate the act.  Although the FAIR Act maintained income supports, 
it entirely revoked entitlements that comprised over half of total farm 
payments prior to the Act.207
B.  Regulating Agricultural Use of Land and Just Compensation 
  Based on the success of these changes, 
ending price support programs should not pose a constitutional prob-
lem under the Due Process Clause. 
The Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on taking property without 
just compensation208 has been extended to include regulatory takings 
where a restriction on land use reduces its value so dramatically that it 
requires compensation.209
 
202
See RAY & SCHAFFER, supra note 
  Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
28, at 2 (“For grain farmers, government pay-
ments can—-depending on the year—-represent all (or more than all) of their net 
farm income.”). 
203
For a discussion of the degree of due process that is required, see Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976), which establishes a balancing test to determine what 
kinds of procedures are required to legitimately deny an individual a property interest. 
204
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 251, 262-65 (1970) (emphasizing that the eligi-
bility for benefits, as defined by the statute, is what supports the claim to entitlement). 
205
See 42 U.S.C. § 416(I)(1)(A)–(D) (2006) (increasing the retirement age by three 
months per year, from sixty-five years in 2000 to sixty-seven years in 2021). 
206
Indeed, an extensive case law search revealed no cases challenging the 1983 
amendments on due process grounds.  
207
See Ahearn et al., supra note 81, at 9 (analyzing the effects of the introduction 
of decoupled payments on farm purchasing behavior). 
208
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
209
See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922) (striking down a Penn-
sylvania law prohibiting coal mining under a residence in a manner that would endan-
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City defined the modern taking doctrine as a balancing test.210  The 
Court considered the economic impact of the regulation on the clai-
mant, the extent to which the regulation interfered with reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations of the property holder, the character of 
the government action, and the regulation’s role in promoting “the 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”211  The case concerned an 
historic landmark law, which prohibited a proposed office tower con-
struction above Grand Central Station.212  The ordinance did not im-
pact current and expected use of the property, nor did it prohibit all 
construction in the airspace.213  The Court concluded that the regula-
tions did not amount to a taking because the regulations were “sub-
stantially related to the promotion of the general welfare” and also 
“permit[ted] reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site.”214
Agricultural regulations more often limit land use than prevent 
construction.
 
215 For example, the Washington State Department of 
Wildlife issued a regulation prohibiting possession, breeding, or sale of 
elk.216  In Schreiner Farms, Inc. v. Smitch, an elk farmer challenged the or-
dinance as a taking because it deprived him of the economic value of 
the land.217  The court disagreed, finding that the regulation did not re-
sult in a total deprivation of economic use, and its protection of wildlife 
was “one of the state’s most important interests.”218
 
ger the structural stability of the home, because the regulation effectively revoked the 
mining rights without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
  Thus, farmers may 
be prohibited from engaging in certain agricultural practices, even if 
such regulation interferes with the current economic use of their land. 
210
438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). 
211
Id. at 125. 
212
Id. at 107. 
213
Id. at 136-37.  
214
Id. at 138. 
215
However, environmental regulations are often challenged as a taking when 
they prohibit construction on uninhabited property.  See, e.g., Broadwater Farms Joint 
Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 154, 156 (1999) (determining that an order to 
restore eleven lots in the plaintiff’s housing development to wetlands under the Clean 
Water Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment because the plaintiff had notice of this 
possibility before he purchased the land, and the Act promoted public welfare).  But 
see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031-32 (1992) (finding that South 
Carolina’s Beachfront Management Act prohibiting the plaintiff from constructing any 
buildings was a taking because it deprived the owner of all economic use of the land, 
and went into effect after he had purchased the lots). 
216
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 232-12-064(2) (2005). 
217
940 P.2d 274, 275-76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
218
Id. at 278-79. 
FOSTER_REVISED_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2011  12:58 PM 
270 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 235 
Farm conservation measures have faced similar takings challenges.  
An Iowa soil erosion regulation219 required one farmer to remove 
cropland from production and to spend more than $12,000 to meet 
erosion standards.220  The court in Woodbury Soil Conservation District v. 
Ortner did not find that this imposition violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, because soil erosion was an important state interest, and 
the cost to the defendant was “one the state has a right to exact.”221  
The court further posited that “[a] law does not become unconstitu-
tional because it works a hardship.”222
An economic imposition alone is insufficient to constitute a tak-
ing.
 
223  A farmer must demonstrate that a reasonable investment-
backed expectation will be destroyed.  Prohibiting an entire agricul-
tural use did not result in a taking under Schreiner Farms because the 
land could be used for other economic purposes.224  Even permanent-
ly removing parts of agricultural land from production and requiring 
financial investment in infrastructure did not rise to the level of a tak-
ing in Ortner, because “[d]efendants still have the use and enjoyment 
of their property, limited only by the necessity to prevent soil erosion 
beyond allowable standards.”225  This line of cases suggests that regu-
lating agricultural production is not a taking because, as in Schreiner 
Farms, the land subject to this regulation may be put to other kinds of 
agricultural use.  Absent a showing of physical invasion or total depri-
vation of economic use, a court will consider whether there is a suffi-
cient public interest to justify the taking.226  Both environmental pro-
tection and public health are sufficient interests to support 
regulations.227
 
219 IOWA CODE ANN. § 467A.49 (West 1974). 
  Indeed the court in Ortner wrote, “It should take no ex-
tended discussion to demonstrate that agriculture is important to the 
welfare and prosperity of this state.  It has been judicially recognized 
220 Woodbury Cnty. Soil Conservation Dist. v. Ortner, 279 N.W.2d 276, 277  
(Iowa 1979). 
221 Id. at 279. 
222 Id. (citing Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Huff, 256 N.W.2d 17, 25 (Iowa 1977)). 
223 Id. 
224 940 P.2d at 279.  The court explained, “Schreiner Farms has failed to establish 
that [the regulation] destroyed or derogated a fundamental attribute of property own-
ership, in particular, the regulation did not amount to a ‘total taking.’”  Id. 
225
279 N.W.2d at 279. 
226
Schreiner Farms, 940 P.2d at 277. 
227
See Ortner, 279 N.W.2d at 278 (“The state has a vital interest in protecting its soil 
as the greatest of its natural resources, and it has a right to do so.”). 
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as our leading industry.”228
C.  Congressional Authority to Regulate Agricultural  
Production and Consumption 
  Thus Fifth Amendment concerns do not 
impose any barriers to regulating agricultural production. 
Congress has regulated agricultural production under its Com-
merce Clause authority since the 1936 Soil Conservation and Domes-
tic Allotment Act.  In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court held that 
the Commerce Clause reaches any activity that in the aggregate exerts 
substantial effects on national markets.229  This ruling effectively over-
turned Butler, which struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1933 as beyond Congress’s authority.230  In Butler the Court held that 
Congress did not have the authority to regulate agricultural produc-
tion under the Commerce Clause because agricultural production was 
an exclusively local concern.231
1.  Limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause  
Authority After Lopez and Morrison 
  Now that the limits of the Commerce 
Clause have been reasserted in Lopez and Morrison, is there room to 
challenge Wickard?  For regulation beyond the reach of the Com-
merce Clause, can Congress turn to the Taxing and Spending Clause 
to authorize the proposed legislation? 
In Wickard, the Supreme Court specifically addressed the manda-
tory wheat production limitations imposed by the 1936 Soil Conserva-
tion Act.232  The Court determined that growing wheat was a commer-
cial activity and could be regulated even when a farmer did not sell 
most of his crop.233
 
228
Id. (citing Benschoter v. Hakes, 8 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Iowa 1943)). 
  The purpose of the legislation was to influence 
national wheat prices by controlling supply, and when Filburn grew 
229
317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).  The Court explained that “even if appellee’s activity 
may be local and though it not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its na-
ture, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.”  Id. 
230
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1936).  
231
Id. at 73.  
232
See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 115 (“The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1938 as related to wheat is to control the volume moving in interstate and 
foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and the consequent ab-
normally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to commerce.”). 
233
See id. at 124 (“Whether the subject of the regulation in question was ‘produc-
tion,’ ‘consumption,’ or ‘marketing’ is, therefore, not material for purposes of decid-
ing the question of federal power before us.”). 
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and consumed wheat on his own farm beyond the maximum quota, 
he added wheat to the national supply that he would have otherwise 
purchased to feed his cattle.234  Even if the amount of wheat that Fil-
burn grew would not on its own affect national commerce, similar ac-
tions of other farmers would have an impact in the aggregate.235
The Supreme Court consistently reaffirmed this interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause over the following five decades.
  Thus, 
Congress could regulate production of agricultural goods grown for 
personal consumption. 
236  However, in 
1995 the Court limited the seemingly boundless commerce authority 
in determining that Congress could not regulate gun possession on or 
near school grounds.237  As in Butler, the Court in Lopez found the re-
gulated area to be a state prerogative holding that Congress could not 
regulate the activity absent a showing it had a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce, or a connection to the channels of interstate 
commerce.238  The Court echoed this holding five years later in Morri-
son.  The Violence Against Women Act challenged in Morrison in-
cluded lengthy congressional findings on the economic impact of vi-
olence against women.239  The Court determined that violence itself is 
not an economic activity, which is why its economic effect cannot be 
aggregated to show an impact on interstate commerce.240
 
234
See id. at 127 (“The effect of consumption of home-grown wheat on interstate 
commerce is due to the fact that it constitutes the most variable factor in the disap-
pearance of the wheat crop.”). 
  Lopez was 
similarly grounded in the finding that gun possession near schools was 
235
Id. at 127-28. 
236
See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981) (holding that 
congressional power to regulate mining under the Commerce Clause extended to regu-
lating surface coal mining operations, because pollution may have effects on more than 
one state); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1971) (upholding a prohibition 
of loan sharking through threats of violence because in the aggregate this activity sup-
ports organized crime, even if the particular defendant did not have ties to organized 
crime); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304  (1964) (upholding the Civil Rights 
Act in an enforcement action against a restaurant that only served in-state customers, be-
cause a substantial portion of the restaurant’s food had moved in interstate commerce). 
237
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).  The statute still remains in 
force, although it now applies only to firearms known to have traveled through or af-
fected interstate commerce.  18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2006).   
238
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
239
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2000) (citing H. R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 103-711, at 385 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 40 (1993); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 
33 (1990)). 
240
See id. at 613 (“Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity.”). 
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not an economic activity.241  Justice Stevens offered a persuasive dissenting 
opinion asserting that guns are articles of commerce falling within Congress’s 
regulatory authority.242
In 2005 the Supreme Court echoed the Wickard holding in Gon-
zales v. Raich, in which respondent Angel Raich challenged the Con-
trolled Substances Act’s prohibition of medical marijuana grown for 
personal consumption.
  In this sense, Lopez and Morrison leave Wickard unal-
tered because growing wheat was a patently economic activity, and thus its im-
pact on interstate commerce may be aggregated. 
243  The Court held that marijuana was a mar-
ketable commodity, and when it traveled in interstate commerce there 
was no means of distinguishing marijuana legally grown for personal 
medical use and commercial marijuana sold for illegal recreational 
use.244  Thus, even though the marijuana Raich grew had not traveled 
in interstate commerce, as in Wickard, the economic activity in the ag-
gregate affected interstate commerce, and consequently Congress 
could regulate it.245
2.  Regulating Consumption Under the Taxing and Spending Clause 
  Similarly, agricultural products, even those grown 
for home consumption or sold to in-state producers, affect the na-
tional market for grains and produce.  Raich is an important reminder 
of the difference between Congress’s authority to regulate commercial 
and noncommercial activities articulated in Lopez and Morrison.  Most 
significantly, Raich confirms that raising agricultural products is most 
certainly an economic activity and thus can be regulated by Congress.   
While agricultural production can be regulated under the mod-
ern Commerce Clause doctrine, regulating consumption is not a 
clearly enumerated power under Article I.  Yet, Congress is permitted 
to condition federal funding on meeting federal policy objectives, 
even if it does not have authority to directly regulate in that area.246
 
241
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
  
242
Id. at 602-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
243
545 U.S. 1, 12-20 (2005). 
244
Id. 
245
Id. at 18-19. The Court reasoned that “[t]he similarities between this case and 
Wickard are striking. . . . In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ 
commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consump-
tion, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the 
national market for that commodity.”  Id. 
246
As the Court stated in South Dakota v. Dole,  
“[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for 
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power 
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For example, the federal government created a minimum drinking 
age of twenty-one by offering federal highway funding to states that 
impose this standard.  In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court held that 
Congress may use the power to tax and spend as an incentive for states 
to adopt policies that Congress cannot directly regulate, provided that 
such inducements are not coercive.247  However, the Butler Court held 
that the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act program payments were 
conditioned on compliance and thus were not voluntary:  “The 
amount offered is intended to be sufficient to exert pressure on [far-
mers] to agree to the proposed regulation.”248  There were two com-
ponents to this holding.  The first concerned marketing agreements, 
whereby processors voted in a referendum to limit total supply, and 
any producer who did not comply with the production quota was 
taxed at such a rate that it amounted to a confiscation of the excess 
crops.249  The Court held that raising revenue was clearly a pretext for 
regulation, and the tax imposed was the penalty for noncompliance.250  
Second, the revenues raised through this penalizing taxation were of-
fered to farmers who complied with the acreage-reduction program.251  
These payments created incentives beyond Congress’s taxation authori-
ty because they were coercive.252
 
found in the Constitution.”  Thus, objectives not thought to be within 
Article I’s “enumerated legislative fields,” may nevertheless be attained 
through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of fed-
eral funds. 
  The Court applied a more relaxed 
standard of coercion in Dole finding that withholding five percent of the 
state’s federal funding for failure to impose a minimum drinking age 
483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 
1, 65-66 (1936)).  
247
Id.  In addition to the limitation on coercion, the spending must be for the 
“general welfare” and Congress must unambiguously state any condition of funding.  
Finally, the conditions imposed on receipt of the funds must be related “to the federal 
interest in particular national projects or programs.”  Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts 
v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)). 
248
Butler, 297 U.S. at 70-71.  
249
Olson, supra note 40, at 6; see also supra subsection I.B.3. 
250
Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-70. 
251
Id. at 70-71. 
252
See id. at 71 (“The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power 
to coerce or destroy.  If the cotton grower elects not to accept the benefits, he will re-
ceive less for his crops; those who receive payments will be able to undersell him.  The 
result may well be financial ruin.”).  The Court then noted that the program was not 
particularly successful at coercing compliance.  See supra Part I. 
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did not “pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”253  
More recently, the Seventh Circuit held that the federal Swampbuster 
program (denying benefits to farmers who converted wetlands to agri-
cultural production)254  was not unconstitutionally coercive, and by de-
nying certiori the Supreme Court may have indicated that it was not yet 
willing to disturb the circuit court’s conclusion.255
The best model for tax-based consumption disincentives is tobac-
co taxation.  Tobacco excise taxes are framed as revenue-raising provi-
sions, although they have a significant impact on tobacco consump-
tion.  For example, the largest increase in federal tobacco taxes was 
passed as a funding measure in the 2009 Children’s Health Insurance 
Program Reauthorization Act (CHIP).
 
256  This statute increased feder-
al tobacco taxes from $0.39 per pack of cigarettes to $1.01 per pack.257  
Studies show that every ten percent increase in cigarette tax results in 
a four percent decrease in tobacco use.258  While smoking cessation 
was the policy purpose of the financing provision, the measure was 
framed purely as a revenue-raising effort, avoiding any of the constitu-
tional questions that arose in Butler.  Moreover, cigarettes are not 
taxed to the extent of confiscation.  Imposing excise taxes on highly 
processed foods could be implemented as a financing measure in a 
number of federal statutes, as was done in CHIP.259
CONCLUSION 
  Therefore, if 
there is sufficient political will, there is no constitutional barrier to 
encouraging better food production and consumption through excise 
taxes. 
The federal government alone cannot reverse obesity and related 
diseases, but it may encourage certain behavior to make it possible for 
families to make healthier food choices.  Beyond improving public 
 
253
483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 
590 (1937)).   
254
16 U.S.C. §§ 3821–3824 (2006). 
255
Horn Farms, Inc. v. Johanns, 397 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 
1018 (2006). 
256
§ 701, I.R.C. § 5701 (Supp. III 2010). 
257
See id. § 701(b), I.R.C. § 5701(b) (increasing taxes from $19.55 to $50.33 per 
thousand cigarettes).  
258
Steady Increases in Tobacco Taxes Promote Quitting, Discourage Smoking, CENTERS 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/Features/SecondhandSmoke (last visited 
Oct. 15, 2011). 
259
For example, some costs of the Affordable Care Act could be offset with taxes on 
disease-causing processed foods in order to further reduce national healthcare costs. 
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health, the key question is whether taxpayers should spend twenty bil-
lion dollars each year to reduce the cost of highly processed, low-
nutrition foods.  Current farm programs push farmers to intensively 
cultivate millions of acres of the same crop and make it less expensive 
to purchase feed grain than to grow it on the farm.  These are not is-
sues of economies of scale, but are the direct result of the government 
paying the difference between the cost of production and a much 
lower market price.  Eliminating these price supports and coupled in-
come payments seems to be an obvious policy choice, but determining 
which legislative measures would produce the desired effects is a more 
complex problem. 
While nutritional programs and health initiatives are beginning to 
address consumer food choice, the most direct consumer incentive is 
prices, not educational programs alone.260
 
 Income supports need to 
actually support farm income, not prices, and should be decoupled 
from production.  Polyculture is an important way to stabilize farm in-
come, while increasing the supply of produce and lowering the cost to 
consumers.  Finally, requiring processed food manufacturers to inter-
nalize the costs they impose on consumers will alleviate consumer 
choice between short-term food costs and long-term health care costs.  
These reforms will reduce the relative cost of healthy foods as com-
pared to unhealthy foods, enabling consumers to make good nutri-
tional and financial choices.  It is imperative that the 2012 Farm Bill 
alter production trends and consumer habits in order to address this 
national health crisis. 
 
 
260
See Gandal & Shabelansky, supra note 185, at 10 (showing that price sensitivity is 
an important influence on food choice). 
